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After two decades of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and peace process; sustainable 
peace seems to be unattainable. The (compromised) hopes of the Palestinian people to 
establish their future independent state on merely twenty two per cent of the historical 
Palestine area, seem to evaporate with the failure of the peace process, the expansion of the 
Israeli settler-colonial occupation and the entrenchment of the apartheid status. The signing 
of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 was supposed to conclude in 1999 with the emergence of 
an independent Palestinian state by tackling the final status issues; however as of today 
neither a Palestinian state nor a peace process do exist. Understanding, analysing and 
exploring the reasons for the failure of the peace process has always fascinated scholars and 
researchers alike.  
 
This failure of the peace process was due to various reasons such as; the asymmetry of power 
between both sides; the weak Palestinian negotiation performance; the division between the 
inside and outside leaderships; the Israeli inflexibility and lack of interest in sustainable 
peace; the involved actors’ different readings and interpretations of the agreements clauses; 
the limitations of the third parties problematic involvement; the bias of the United States in 
favour of Israel and its exclusive domination on the process; and finally the expansion of the 
Jewish settlements/colonies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In light of this set of failure 
reasoning, it remains relevant to ask: Was the peace process from the early beginnings 
doomed to fail? What went wrong, why and by whom? How did the intra-Palestinian politics 
and styles of governance interact with the peace process and affected its progress and 
outcomes? And what lesson can be learnt from two decades of negotiations and failed peace 
settlement? 
 
These are the set of questions to which Ghassan Khatib has provided interesting, detailed and 
historically embedded answers in his recent book, Palestinian Politics and the Middle East 
Peace Process: Consensus and Competition in the Palestinian Negotiating Team. The task of 
this book “is to provide a more nuanced and corrective understanding of the Palestinian 
leadership” through tackling the relationship between the inside and outside leaderships and 
how they interact with the structural and environmental defects of the peace process.1 
Building on his direct experience as a member of the Palestinian delegation to the peace 
negotiation, the author examines to what extent did the composition and behaviour of the 
Palestinian negotiating team or leadership have an impact on the process and outcomes of 
the negotiations with Israel from Madrid to Oslo II, between 1991 to 1997. In doing so, Khatib 
provides a background deliberation through the lenses of the leadership role and the 
structure and outcome of the peace process; examines the emergence and nature of the 
Palestinian leadership since 1949 and analyses and discusses the Palestinian participation in 
the peace process, in particular the Madrid conference and the Washington negotiations. The 
author also examines the performance of the Palestinian delegation in the negotiation 
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towards the 1993 Oslo agreement through the inside-outside leadership dichotomy. The 
author ends his analysis by reflecting on the implementation of the Declaration of Principles, 
the emergence of the new Palestinian élite and the consequences of the peace process 
failure.  
 
Khatib argues that “there was no significant political difference between the inside and 
outside as distinct groups during the peace process from Madrid till the Interim Agreement in 
1996.”2 Thus, the relationship between the Palestinian inside and outside leaderships was 
complementary: the inside needed the legitimacy and political access of the outside, and the 
outside needed the unity and representation of the inside.3 This complementary role is the 
major argument and main thrust of the book which makes it almost distinctive from other 
scholarly work in this field. However, he also argues that the contrasting realities out of which 
these two leaderships were born, led them to subsequently employ different approaches and 
priorities.4 Moreover, the book makes it clear that the structure and open-ended nature of 
the process and its effect on the behaviours of the leadership; the vagueness of the terms of 
reference; the restriction on Palestinian representation; and the partial role of the sponsor all 
contributed to the weakness of the Palestinian leadership, and its negotiation performance.5 
This in turn, led to an increase in violence and strengthened the opposition, reducing the 
leadership’s popularity and allowing it to be further exploited in negotiations.6 
 
While the composition of and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership were not the only 
factors that had an impact on the process and outcome of negotiations, however, the overall 
conclusion of this book is that the continuous changes made by the leadership in the 
composition of its negotiating teams, in particularly the marginalization of the internal 
leadership (and later its exclusion), displaced previously complementary relations and led to 
subsequently poor negotiating performance and ultimately flawed agreements. These, in turn 
(and bearing in mind a continuously hostile negotiating environment) led to a still poorer 
performance in the on-going negotiations.7 
 
The strength of this book is that it is inspired by the participation in the peace negotiations 
and the author being in the Palestinian ‘political kitchen’ until today with the wealth of 
insider insights and unique access. Additionally, through the historical analysis, the author 
manages to take the reader into a journey in the details of the early beginnings of the peace 
process which allow the observers to link the old events with the current trajectories. Hence, 
the book serves an alert duty and is an eye-opener to a better understanding of the 
deteriorating conditions of today due to the disastrous decisions that had been taken in the 
past. 
 
On the other hand, this book suffers from a few drawbacks despite the larger contribution it 
offers. The reader can notice various repetitions throughout the book, particularly in the first 
half, in addition to the various introductory statements which sometime harm the flow of 
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6. Ibid p.172. 
7. Ibid p.4. 
argumentation. To some extent tackling and judging the existent literature was through the 
lenses of the dichotomy which is ‘right’ and which is ‘wrong’ which can be problematic and 
subjective. Also, despite the high expectations at the beginnings that the reader will enjoy a 
wealth of first-hand ground-breaking new insights, information, and argumentation, this was 
slightly exaggerated. Furthermore and arguably, the reader can feel some contradictions in 
the very major argument of the book concerning the complementarity role between the 
Palestinian outside and inside leaderships. The contradictions weakened the argument on a 
few occasions through the provided and discussed empirical evidence and the trajectories of 
the processes. Finally, a substantial part of the book serves as a historical and contextual 
background, which allows less space for further analysis, discussions and reflections. 
 
However, overall this book adds a significant and distinctive contribution to the scholarly 
work on Palestine and provides various hints and insights to what went wrong over the last 
two decades in the Middle East peace process and what can be learnt so as to avoid the 
mistakes in the future. At the end of the day it remains an inspiring book for an uninspiring 
peace process. 
 
 
Alaa Tartir  
London School of Economics 
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